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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 14-1084 
_____________ 
 
LYNN K. CHRISTIAN, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
HONEYWELL RETIREMENT BENEFIT PLAN 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA  
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-13-cv-04144) 
District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 12, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  November 12, 2014 ) 
  
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Lynn Christian (“Christian”) appeals the District Court’s dismissal of 
her complaint as time-barred on the face of the complaint.  The focus of Christian’s 
appeal is the accrual date of her cause of action to recover retirement benefits from her 
deceased husband’s company plan.  We must determine whether her cause of action 
accrued in 2004, and is now time-barred, or whether the accrual date was tolled until 
2012 when Christian discovered the “Waiver of Joint and Surviving Spouse Annuity” 
(the “Waiver”).  We conclude that the District Court correctly found that Christian’s 
cause of action is time-barred.  We will affirm the District Court. 
I. FACTS  
Christian seeks survivor retirement benefits that she asserts should have been paid 
to her by Appellee, the Honeywell Retirement Plan (the “Plan”).  
Christian’s late husband, Howard F. Christian (“Mr. Christian”), worked for 
Honeywell, which sponsored the Plan.  Mr. Christian was a participant in the Plan and 
began receiving Plan benefits upon his retirement in January 1987.  The Plan distributed 
Mr. Christian’s retirement benefits in the form of a single life annuity, in reliance on the 
Waiver.1  Christian now asserts that she did not sign or consent to the Waiver.   
Mr. Christian continued to receive a monthly pension benefit from the Plan until 
his death in 2004.  After her husband’s death, Christian contacted the Plan Administrator, 
                                              
1 This selection resulted in (1) Mr. Christian receiving a larger benefit than he would have 
received had the joint and survivor spouse annuity been chosen and (2) no survivor 
benefits to Christian. 
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Hewitt Associates, LLC (“Hewitt”).  Christian was advised that Mr. Christian’s 
retirement benefits would end.  At no time, however, did the Plan’s representatives advise 
Christian about the Waiver, or that absent such a waiver, she would be entitled to annuity 
benefits.    
Around June 2012, Christian located a file containing a copy of the Waiver that 
had purportedly been signed by her on December 1, 1986.  The Waiver provided the 
basis for cessation of Mr. Christian’s retirement benefits upon his death.    
After she discovered the Waiver, Christian contacted the Plan to contest the 
validity of the Waiver.  Christian submitted a formal claim for benefits pursuant to the 
Plan’s claim procedures.  The Plan denied her initial claim and her appeal.2   
II. Discussion  
The parties agree that Pennsylvania’s four-year statute of limitations applies, 42 Pa 
Const. Stat. § 5525(a)(8), but dispute the relevant date of accrual.   
In the ERISA context, a non-fiduciary cause of action will generally accrue when 
a party’s claim for benefits has been formally denied.  See Romero v. Allstate Corp., 404 
F.3d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).  Under the “clear repudiation” rule, however, an “event 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA.  This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over a grant of a motion to dismiss.  Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 
464 F.3d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 2006).  When considering an appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal, our review is limited to “the contents of the complaint and any attached 
exhibits.”  Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Kulwicki v. 
Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1992)).  We accept as true all well-pled 
allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party.  In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 
2002).    
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other than a denial” can trigger the statute of limitations, “as long as it is (1) a repudiation 
(2) that is clear and made known to the beneficiary.”  Miller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 
475 F.3d 516, 521 (3d Cir. 2007).  “Under this rule, a statute of limitations begins to run 
when a plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury that forms the basis of his 
claim.”  Id. at 520 (citing Romero, 404 F.3d at 222).   
The District Court correctly determined that Christian’s claim for benefits accrued 
in July 2004 when the Plan benefits were discontinued.  Regarding the first requirement 
under Miller, the total cessation of benefit payments to Mr. Christian was a clear 
repudiation because it was a full termination of benefits.  See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-
1(m)(4) (defining “adverse benefit determination” to include “a denial, reduction, or 
termination of, or a failure to provide or make payment (in whole or in part ) for, a 
benefit”)).  Like a denial of benefits, the total cessation of benefit payments is adverse to 
the beneficiary and therefore repudiates his rights under a plan. 
Under Miller’s second requirement, repudiation by the cessation of benefit 
payments should ordinarily be made known to the beneficiary when they do not receive 
the payment to which they allege they are entitled.  Cf. Miller, 475 F.3d at 522 
(repudiation should have been clear to beneficiary when he first received a miscalculated 
benefit award).  Here, Christian spoke with the Plan’s representatives after her husband’s 
death and was informed that all benefits would be terminated.  Thus, the termination of 
Plan benefits was clear and made known to Christian.  Id. at 521.   
Christian’s claim that she was unaware of her legal entitlement to receive survivor 
benefits until she found the Waiver cannot save her claim.  When Christian became 
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aware of the cessation of Plan benefits in 2004, she “should [have] exercise[d] reasonable 
diligence” to find out if she had a claim for survivor annuity benefits.  Id. at 522.  Under 
such circumstances, where there was an outright repudiation at the time of Mr. 
Christian’s death, it was reasonable to expect that the statute of limitations would begin 
to run at that point.  Accordingly, Christian’s claim was time-barred when she filed her 
complaint.     
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
